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OCTOBER TERM, 1977 
No. 76- 1701 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, PETITIONER 
v. 
HIRAM G.HILL, JR., ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER 
OPINIONS BELOW [r<.. g I ] 
The opinion of the court of appeals (~:r> . ~) 
is loeported at 549 F. 2d 1064. The opinion of the dis-
trict court E-P~. ~ is reported at 419 F. Supp. 
753. r: ('L '3,] 
JURISDICTION [ R. 'l 7 ] 
The judgIuent of the court of appeals (~et. App 
en was entered on January 31, 1977. The petition 
for a writ of certiorari was filed on May 31, 1977, 
and granted on November 14, 1977 (A. 588). The 
jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). 
(1) 
I 
2 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether the Endangered Species Act of 1973 
prohibits completion of a federal water project that 
was more than 50 percent complete when the :Act was 
passed and was approximately 75 percent complete 
when a newly discovered fish was listed as an en-
dangered species undel> the Act because its habitat 
would he threatened by the project. 
2. vVhether, when a species is listed under the En-
dangered Species Act, a federal water project that 
is substantially finished may be completed and used 
despite its adverse effects on the species if Congress, 
with full knowledge of such effects, continues to ap-
prove the project by appropriating funds for its com-
pletion and specifically states, . through the reports 
<-
of appropriations. committees, that it should be 
completed. ' ., 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 
87 Stat. 892, 16 U.RC. (Supp. V) 1536, provides: 
Interagency Cooperation. 
The Secretary shall review other programs 
administered by him and utilize such programs 
in furtherance of the purposes of this Act. All 
other Federal departments and agencies shall, 
in consultation with and with the, assistance 
o,f the SecretarY, utilize their authorities in 
furth:rancepf 'i'the; purpose.s of this Act by 
e,arrylpg out , prQgr~msfor . the conservation . of 
" endapge'red.spec~es ,an:dthreatened ' species 
listed 'pursUant t()~ec£ion 4 of this Act and by 
3 
taking such action necessary to insure that 
actions authorized, funded; or carried out by 
them do not jeopardize the continued existence 
of such endangered species and threatened 
species or result in the destruction or modificac. 
tion of habitat of such species which is de-
termined by the ,Secretary, after consultation 
as appropriate with the affected States, to be 
critical. 
STATEMENT 
In 1966 Congress appropriated initial funds for the 
construction by the Tennessee Valley Authority 
("TV A") of the Tellico Dam and Reservoir pr oject, 
a federal multi-purpose dam and reservoir on the 
Little Tennessee River in eastern Tennessee (Pet. 
App. A, p. 2A; Environmental Defense Fund v. Ten-
nessee Valley A~tthority, 468 F. 2d 1164, 1170 (C . ~L\.. 6) 
(((Tellico I")).l Tellico is a comprehensive water re-
source and regional development project designed to 
develop navigation, control flooding, generate electric 
power, provide water Isupply, promote industrial and \ 
recreational development, and generally improve eco-
nomic 'conditions in an economically depressed area 
(Pet. App. A, p. 2A). 
Construction began in March 1967 (Pet. App. A, 
p . . 2A). Congress has appropriated funds for the proj-
1 The appropriation Act was Public Works Appropriation Act, 
1967, 80 Stat. 1002, 1014. Sections 4(j)and 27 of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority Act, 48 Stat. 61, 71, 16 U.S.C. 831c(j) and 
831z, contain general authorizations for TVA projects. Con!!ress 
periodically appropriates funds for speGific projects. Cono-ressional 
, decision-making with respect to the construction and car;yino-fOl'-
ward of particular TV A projects is t.hus largely ,confined .;'p the 
appropriations process. 
4 
ect in every year since 1966 (Tellico I, supra, 468 F. 
2d at 1170; Pet. App. B, pp. 31A- 32A; see also pp. 
7-11, 14- 18, infret). At present the project is virtually 
complete and ready for the closing of the gates to 
impound the reservoir.2 
,The project has been the subject of previous litiga-
tion. In 1972 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed a preliminary injunction that halted con-
struction of the project until TVA complied with the 
applicable requirement'S of the National Environment-
al Policy Act (N-EPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. 4321 
et seq. (Tellico I; sup1'a). The district court ultimately 
concluded ' that TVA's final environmental impact 
statement for Tellico complied with NEPA (Envi1'on-
1nental Defense Funcl v. Tennessee Vetlley Authority, 
' 371 ' F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn.)), and ' the court of 
appeals, in 1974, affirmed. Environmental Defense 
F~mcl v. Tennessee Vedley A~tthority, 492 F . 2d 466 
(C.A. 6) (((Tellico II"). 
In August 1973, a three-inch fish, named the snail 
darter (because it feeds on fresh-water snails), was 
discovered in the stretch of the river scheduled to be 
2 The Chairman of TVA's Board of Directors reported to 
committees of both Houses of Congress on March 7, 1977: 
"[The project] stands ready for the gates to be closed and the 
reservoir filled" (Hearings on Public 'Works :for 'Vater and Power 
Development and Energy Research Appropriation Bill, 1978, be-
f()l~ea Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess., Palt 4, 234 (1977); Hearings on Public 
\Vorlcs for Water and Power Development and Energy Research 
Appropriation Bill, 1978, before a Subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 5, 127 
(1977) ). Certain additional work such as completion of roads and 
bridges, entailing relatively minor expenditures, remains to be 
;finished. 
i 
:5 
impounde·d by the reservoir (Pet. App. A, p. 4A). 
Darters are members of the perch family. There are 
approximately 130 known species of darters, 85 to 90 
of which are found in Tennessee. Eight to ten new 
ones have been discovered in the last five years, and 
,about 12 in the last ten years.3 
In December 1973, when the Tellico project was 
more than 50 percent complete (Pet. App. B, p. 33A), 
Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 
87 Stat. 884, 16 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1531 et seq. Section 
7 of the Act, 87 Stat. 892, 16 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1536, 
titled "Interagency Cooperation," provides in full: 
The Secretary [of the Interior] shall revievy 
other programs administered by him and utilize 
Isuch programs in furtherance of the purposes 
of this Act. All other Federal departmerits and 
agencies shall, in consultation with and with 
the assistance of the Secretary, utilize their 
authorities in furtherance of the purposes of 
thi,s Act by carrying out programs for the con-
servation of endangered species and threatened 
species listed pursuant to section 4 of this Act 
and by taking such action necessary to insure 
that actions authorized, funded, or carried out 
by them do not jeopardize the continued exist-
ence of such endangered species and threatened 
3 TVA's final environmental ' impact statement :for the Tellico 
project (approved in E'i1I/)ironmental Defense F'I1Ind v. Tenne88ee 
Valley A u.th()rity, 371F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn.), affirmed in 
Tellic() II, 81tpra, 492 F . 2d 466), listed 11 species of darters 
known to occur, or possibly occurring, in the portions of the 
Little Tennessee River to be impounded (Pet. App. H, p. 3IA, 'n. 
7). The district court here noted that "new species of the darter 
continued to be discovered in Tennessee at about the rate of one 
per year" ; ( ibid.) . 
species or result in the destruction ormodifica-
tion of habitat of such species which is deter-
mined by the Secretary, after consultation as 
appropriate with the affected States, to be 
critical. . 
In January 1975, respondents and others petitioned 
the Secretary of the Interior to list the snail darter as 
an endangered species pUI'lSuant to Section 4 of the 
Act, 16 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1533. In November 1975, 
when the Tellico project was approximately 75 percent 
completed (Pet. App. B, p. 33A), .the Secretary desig-
nated the snail darter as an endangered species (40 
Fed. Reg. 47505-47506). He did so on the basis 
of his determination that the only known habitat of 
the fish was that portion of the Little .Temlessee River 
scheduled to be impounded by the Tellico Reservoir,. 
and that "[t]he proposed impoundment of water be-
hind the proposed Tellico ' Dam would result in total 
destruction of the snail darter'lS habitat" (id. at 
47506). In Apri11976, the Secretary designated a por-
tion of the river included within the area of the pro-
posed reservoir as the snail darter's "critical habitat" 
pursuant to Section 7 of the Act. 41 Fed. Reg. 13926-
13928. 
In February 1976, respondents filed this suit pur-
suant to Section 11(g) of the Act, 16 U.S.C. (Supp. 
V) 1540(g),4 to enjoin the completion of the , dam and 
the impoundment of the reservoir on the ground that 
416 U.S.C . . (Supp. V) 1540(g) ptovides in pertinent part 
that "any person may conuilence a·civil suit on :his own behalf **'* 
to enjoin * * * any ** * governmental instrumentality or' agency 
* * * who is alleged to be in violation of allY provision: Mthis chap-
ter or regulation issued under . the authority there6f *' *' *.'" 
7 
those ;actions would violate Sections 7 and 9 of the Act, 
16 U.S.-C. (Supp. V) 1536, 1538.5 
Prior to and during this litigation, members of 
TVA's Board of DirectoDs testified for three succes-
sive years, 1975, 1976, and 1977, in House and Senate 
appropriations hearings in support of budget requests 
for various TVA projects, including Tellico, submitted 
by the President. They testified about all aspects of 
the problems involving the snail darter and the Tellico 
project, including the discovery of the ~nail darter, its 
listing as an endangered species, its habitat, and the 
effect of the project on it. 
In hearings in April 1975 before a Subcommittee of 
the House Committee on Appropriations, they de-
scribed the discovery of the snail darter and the 
efforts by opponents of the project to halt its comple-
tion by relying on the Endangered Species Act.6 They 
5 While respondents contended in both the district court and 
the court of appeals that the completion of the project would 
violate Section 9 of the Act, that question was not reached be-
low (Pet. App. A, p. 9A n. 13). Section 9(a) (1) (B) makes it un-
lawful to "take any [endangered] species within the United 
States." Section 3(14), 16 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1532(14), of the 
Act defines "take" as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, 
kill, trap, capture, or collect * * *." In adopting this definition, 
Congress deleted "the destruction, modifi'cation, or curtailment of 
its habitat or range" from the list of prohibited activities. Com-
pare the original language of Section 3 (6) of S. 1983, 93d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1973 L with Section 3 (14) oHhe Act. 
6 Hearings on Public Works for Water and Power Development 
and Energy Research Appropriation Bill, 1976, before a Subcom-
mittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 
1st Bess., Part 7, 466-467 (1975); see also Hearings on Public 
Works for Water and Power Development and Energy Research 
Appropriation Bill, 1976, before a Subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 4, 3775-
3777 (1975). 
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stated that in TV A.'s view the Act did not prohibit the 
completion of a project ~uthorized, funded, and sub-
stantially constructed before the Act was passed, con-
cluding that: 
[W]hile we will do our best to preser~e .the 
darter if it in fact proves to be a dlstmct 
species and is listed as endangered, the project 
should be completed in any event * * *. rJ 
In recommending appropriations of $29 million for 
the Tellico project through September 1976, the 
House Committee on Appropriations, in its report 
dated June 20,1975, stated: 
The Committee directs that the project, for 
which an environmental impact statement has 
been completed and provided the Committee, 
should be completed as promptly as possible 
for energy supply and flood protection in the 
public interest. [8] 
The bill appropriating that amollnt vvas passed by 
Congress and signed by the President in December 
1975, one month after the snail darter was placed on 
the endangered species list. Public ,Vorks for Water 
and Power Development and Energy Research A ppro-
priation Act, 1976, 89 Stat. 1035, 1047.9 
In appropriations hearings in March 1976 in the 
House and Senate, TVA Directors again testified about 
7 Hearings on Public vVorks for Ii\! aWl' and Power Development 
and Energy Research Appropriation Bill, 1976, before a Subcom-
mittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess., Part 7, 467 (1975). 
g H.R. Rep. No. 94-319, 94tJh Cong., 1st Sess. 7u (1975). 
9 The appropriations Acts involved in this case provided 
lump sum appropriations for TV 1\ and did not themselves 
identify the projects for which the sums had been appro-
priated. Identification of these projects requires reference to 
the legislative history. . 
1 
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the statu:s of the snail darter and about this recently 
filed lawsuit. They reiterated TVA's position "that 
Congress did not intend the Endangered Species Act 
to be retroactively applied to existing projects like Tel-
lico, which vms over 50 percent complete at the time 
of the act's passage and the fish's discovery, and 
which was 70 to 80 percent complete at the time of 
the official listing of the snail darter as an endangered 
species." 10 
Meamvhile, respondent Hiram Hill testified at the 
appropriations hearings in . the House a11d submitted 
a written statement attacking the Tellico project and 
TVA's view of the Endangered Species Act." Mr. 
Hill began his statement with the contention that 
"[ t ]he long debated TVA Tellico proj ect is in direct 
conflict with the Rare and Endangered Species Act 
of 1973," and he reiterated that contention through-
out his statement and accompanying testimony. He 
asserted that "[t]he project should be halted now 
10 TVA added, inter aUa: "IV" e are doing our best to preserve 
the snail darter, and the results to date have been very 
encournging. "IV" e cannot guamntee that the transplant [of 
the fish to another riverJ will ultimately be a success. In any 
event * '" * we believe the Tellico project must be completed on 
schedule." Hearings on Public vVorks for vVater and Power De-
velopment and Energy Research Appropriation Bill, 1977, before 
a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess., Part 5, 261-262 (1976) ; Hearings on Public Works 
for V\Tater and Power Development and Energy Research Appro-
priation Bill, 1977, before a Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 4, 3096-3099 
(1976). 
11 Hearings on Public 'Vorks for IV" ater and Power Development 
and Energy Research Appropriation Bill, 1977, before a Subcom-
mittee of the House Committee on Appropriations,94th Cong~, 2d 
Sess., Part S, 979-984 (1976). ' 
10 
and all Unused funds -for the project should b~ re-
called. " 1~ _ " 
, Following these , hearings, both the ,House and the 
Senate Committees recommended the full Presidential 
budget request of $9.7 million for Tellico for the fiscal 
year ending September 30, 1977.1 3 IIi its report of 
.June 17, 1976, the Senate Committee made the fol-
lowing statement: 
TELLICO PROJECT 
The bill, as reported, contains the full $9.7 
million budget request for the Tellico project. 
During subcommittee hearings, TV A was ques-
tioned about the relationship between the Tel-
lico project's completion and the November 1975 
listing of the snail darter (a small 3-inch fish 
which was discovered in 1973) as an endangered 
species under the Endangered Species Act. TVA 
informed the Committee that it was continuing 
its efforts to preserve the darter, while working 
towards the scheduled 1977 completion date. 
'TVA repeated its view that the ' Endangered 
Species Act did not prevent the completion of 
the 'Tellico project, which has been under con-
struction for nearly a decade. The subcommit-
tee brought this matter, as well as the recent 
U.S. District Court's decision upholding TVA's 
decision to complete the project, to the atten-
tion of the full C()mmittee. The Committee does 
not view the Endangered Species Act as pro-
hibiting the completion of the Tellico project 
at its advanced stage and directs that this proj-
12Id. at 979. 
l:t S. Rep. NO'. 94,-960, 94th CO'ng., 2d Sess. 96 (1976); H.R. Rep. 
No. 94-1223, 94th CO'ng., 2d Sess.83 (1976). 
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ect be completed as promptly as possible in the 
public interest. [14] 
The appropriations bill passed both Houses of Con-
gress on .June 29, '1976, and was signed into law by 
the President on .July 12. Public Works for Water 
and Power Development and Energy Research Ap-
propriation Act, 1977, Pub. L. 94-355, 90 Stat. 889, 
899. 
The district court, on May 25, 1976, denied respond-
ents'. request to enjoin completion of the project 
and dismissed the complaint (Pet. App. B). Although 
the court found that impoundment of the reservoir 
would "result in the adverse modification, if not com.,. 
plete destruction, of the snail darter's critical habi-
tat" (icl. at 27A- 28A), it concluded that the Endan-
gered Species Act was not intended to prohibit the 
completion of a project that was authorized and begun 
seven years before the Act was passed and which at 
the time of the trial (April 1976) was about 80 per-
cent completed with about $80 million invested (icl. at 
33A- 34A) 36A). The court stated: 
At some point ill time a federal project be-
comes so near completion and so incapable of 
modifica,tion that a court of . equity should not 
apply a statute enaCted long after inception of 
the project to produce ' an unreasonable result 
[icl.at 36A- 37 A]. 
-,----.,.,-" , , ' -
• 14 S. Rep. NO'. 94-96(), supra, at p. 96. The CO'urt of appeals er-
rO'necmsly characterized this stat~ment arid the statement in the 
1975 report O'f the House ApprO'priations CO'mmittee (see p.8, 
supra) as "prO'nO'uncements of twO' cO'ngressional apprO'priations 
subcO'mmittees" (Pet. App. A, p. 18A). ' 
(l 
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The court found support for its view in Congress's 
continued appropriations for the project with full 
knowledge of its effect on the snail darter (id. at 
39A). And it fonnd that "[t]he nature of the project is 
such that there are no alternatives to impoundment of jJ 
the reservoir, short of scrapping the entire project" 
Ucl. at 31A). 
On January 31, 1977, the court of appeals reversed 
(Pet. App. A). The court held that closure of the 
dam, since it would jeopardize the continued existence 
of the snail darter, would violate the provision of Sec-
tion 7 of the Endangered Species Act which "un-
equivocally commits" all federal agencies to 
utilize their authorities in furtherance of the 
purposes of [the Act] by * * * taking such 
action necessary to insure that actions author-
ized, funded, or carried out by them do 110t 
jeopardize the continued existence of such 
endangered species and threatened species or 
result in the destruction or modification of 
habitat of such species which is determined 
by the Secretary * * * to be critical [Pet. 
App. A, p. 5A (emphasis by the court).] 
The court rejected the argument made by TVA, and 
accepted by the district court, that Section 7 should 
not be read "to include the terminal phases of on-
going projects among the 'actions' of departments 
and agencies to be scrutinized for compliance" (icl. 
at 11A). It said instead that it would "give the term 
'actions' its plain meaning" Ucl. at l1A), declaring 
that"[ c] onscientious enforcement of the Act requires 
13 
that it be taken to its logical extreme" (icl. at 12A).1' 
Although the court was "sympathetic to [the district 
court's] analysis of the equitable factors present here 
- 4---
which would normally militate aga111st granu111g 111-
junctive relief," it held that the district court "abused 
its discl'etion when it refused to enjoin a clear viola-
tion of federal law" (icl. at 20A) by refusing "to 
permanently enjoin all further actions by TVA which 
may detrimentally alter the critical habitat of the 
snail darter" (id. at 18A). 
The court of appeals declined to attribute any sig-
nificance to the appropriations statutes of 1975 and 
1976 or to the reports of the House Appropriations 
Committee 111 1975 and the Senate Appropriations 
Committee in 1976 (see pp. 8-10, supra) directing 
completion of the project "as promptly as possible 
in the public interest." The court held that those 
apprOlJTiations Acts and statements did not constitute 
"legislative acquiescence in or express ratification of" 
TVA's position that the Endangered Species Act was 
not intended to apply to the Tellico project (icl. at 
15A). It said that they were "[a]dvisory opinions by 
15 The district wurt had posed a hypothetical example: 
If plaintiffs' argument were taken to its logical ex-
treme, the Act would require a court to halt impound-
ment of water behind a fully completed dam if an 
endangered species were discovered in the river on the 
day before SHoh impotmdment was scheduled to take 
place [Pet. App_ B, p. 43A]. 
The district court stated: "We cannot conceive that Congress 
intended such a result" (ibid.) _ The wurt of appeals repeated 
the example and embraced the result (Pet. App_ A, p.12A). 
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Congress" concerning the scope of the Act, which 
could not bind the court "[iJf the separation of 
powers doctrine is to retain its vitality * * * " (id. 
at 15A- 16A). 
In March 1977, following the decision of the court 
of appeals, members of TVA's Board of Directors 
again testified at House and Senate hearings in sup-
port of requested appropriations, including appropri-
ations for completing certain ancillary parts of the 
Tellico project, such as public use areas, roads, and 
bridges. They again reported on all aspects of the 
snail darter problem, including the decision of the 
court of appeals. Among other things, they stated that 
the snail darters transplanted to two other rivers "are 
. doing well and have reproduced," and that there were 
I about the same numb~r of the fish in the tra~splant areas as there were III the proposed reserVOIr · area (Hearings on Public Works for Water and P ower 
Development and Energy Research Appropriation 
Bill,1978, before a Subcommittee of the House Com-
mittee on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.; Part 
4, 235, 261- 262 (1977) .. 1 6 The Directors reported that 
the Tellico dam "stands ready for the gates.to be 
closed and the reservoir fillecl"(id. at 234), and asked 
16 At the trial respondents' witnesses testified that .. the trans-
plant program was a "good one" (A. 185), that they found "no 
fault" with it (A. 199), and that TVA was "doing everything 
humanly possible to conserve the snaildarter41 while completing 
the project (A. 158). The district court found that" [tJhe evidence 
shows that TV A has made a good faith effort to conserve the snail 
diutei while carrying out its plans to complete the protect" (Pet. 
App. B, p. 30A.). 
1;5 
for guidance from Congress with respect to the con-
flict between the court of appeals' decision halting the 
project and Congre,ss's directives to TVA in 1975 and 
1976 to complete the project" as promptly as possible 
* * * in the public interest" (id. at 235- 236). 
The House Appropriations Committee in its report 
of June 2, 1977, recommended appropriation of the 
full amount requested in the President's budget for 
the Tellico project (H.R. Rep. No. 95-379, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1977)). The Committee stated: 
It is the Committee's view that the Endangered 
Species Act was not intended to halt proj ects 
such as these in their advanced stage of com-
pletion, and [the OommitteeJ strongly recom-
mends that these projects not be stopped be-
cause of misuse of the Act rid. at 104]. 
The Committee recommended that instead of delaying 
or stopping such projects, the endangered species 
should be relocated: 
Where such work is determined to be a threat 
to . any endangered species, the Committee 
recommends that the agencies cooperate fully 
with the Secretary of Interior, as cont'em-
II~J. •• plated by the Act, to re~~ci1!~.,.the . endangered -J.o ~---:r 
species to another suit~ble habItat. so as to pe~- 'J\"...~~. 
mit' the project to proceed as rapIdly as POSSl- ivu..~~ 
] 
I ~V1di..,.,~, 
ble [id. at 11 . -;~. 
To facilitate such relocation the Committee recom- t:..,:,n~ 
'-4'h.f 
mended . special appropriations totaling $9 million, of 
which $2 million was for TV A', explaining: 
It is expected that this arrangement will 
.. provide a positive means to expedite construc-
25'3-835- 77- 4 
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tion of projects deemed important enough to 
be funded in this bill, and at the same time to 
permit the attainment of the purposes of the 
Endangered Species Act. The relocation of en-
dangered species, rather than delay or stoppage 
of projects, should be of direct benefit to both 
progTams and should obviate the need for con-
frontation and litigation between those charged 
,vith the responsibilities for each [ibid.]. 
The Senate Appropriations Committee concurred 
in the House Committee's recommendations with re-
spect to both the amount requested for Tellico and the 
special appropriations for relocation of endangered 
species (S. Rep. No. 95- 301, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 
98 (1977)). After referring to the court of appeals' 
decision, the Senate COlIDnittee stated that it had 
I ~arefully reviewed" Tellico and another TVA project, 
t and concluded that: 
A thorough balancing of the benefits of the 
projects against · their environmental conse-
quences has been performed. These projects will 
provide needed flood · control; jobs and indus-
trial development; ,vater supply and recrea-
tional opportunities; improved navigation in 
the case of Tellico; and other benefits. In addi-
tion, the Tellico project will provide an average 
of about 200 million kilmvatt hours of elec-
tricity annually. These projects are sound re-
gional development projects which are vitally 
important to the people of the regions affected. 
This Committee has not viewed the Endangered 
Species Act as preventing the completion and I use of these projects which were well under ·way 
\ at the time the affected species were listed as 
endangered. If the act has such an effect, 
., 
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which is contrary to the Committee's under-
standing of the intent of Congress in enacting 
the Endangered Species Act, funds should be 
appropriated to allow these projects to be com-
pleted and their benefits realized in the public 
interest, the Endangered Species Act notwith-
standing. 
* * * Congress, having been fully informed 
·of the Endangered Species Act problem as re-
lated to these projects, approved the appropri-
ation for the Tennessee Valley Authority for 
these projects, based on the Committee's view 
of the Endangered Species Act and its appli-
cation to the Tellico and Duck River projects. 
The Committee again recommends approval of 
the appropriations based on the foregoing views 
and considerations [id. at 99J. 
The appropriations bill as proposed by the com-
mittees was debated on the floor of both Houses. The 
debate in the House of Representatives included a 
discussion of the snail darter and othei' endangered 
species. Congressman Bevill, floor manager of the bill, 
stated (123 Congo Rec. H5760-H5766 (daily ed., 
J nne 13, 1977)): 
We are recommending $131,823,000 for the 
Tennessee Valley Authority. 
We heard considerable testimony from TVA 
witnesses concerning the snail darter and the 
pearly mussel, endangered species that now 
threaten the completion of two TVA water re-
source projects, the Tellico Dam and the Co-
·lmnbia Dam. It is our belief that in too many 
instances, these examples included, the En-
dangered Species Act is being used as a yehicle 
. ~.'~:-~ 
. I 
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not to protect threatened wildlife, but to stop 
growth and progress. 
We are impressed with the need for these 
projects and are confident that the endangered 
species can be sufficiently protected through re-
locations and other efforts. Consequently, fund-
ing is recommended for these projects and we 
encourage the TVA to find equitable solutions 
to the problems posed by the endangered 
species. 
The bill was approved by both Houses and signed into 
law on August 7, 1977 (Public ,!If orks for Water and 
Power Development and Energy Research Appropri-
ation Act, 1978, Pub. L. 95-96, 91 Stat. 797). The 
Act (91 Stat. 808), in appropriating funds to TVA 
to complete the Tellico project and for other pur-
poses, stated: 
That not to exceed $2,000,000 of this appropria-
~,\ tion is available to carr out the urposes of 
\ the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (Public 
Law 93-205), as amended, including coopera-
t 
tive efforts as contemplated by that Act to re-
locate endangered or threatened species to other 
suitable habitats as may be necessary to expe-
diteproject constTuction.c,17] 
r ~ 1/ -1-7 -1I-l -F-ebruary 1977 , TVA petitioned the Secretary of the 
Interior to withdraw his designation of the Little Tennessee 
River as a critical habitat of the snail darler on the basis of 
(1) evidence that some 700 snail darters transplanted to an-
other river in 1975 had reproduced and increased, and (2) evi-
dence that the very existence of the dam, even without closure 
of the sluice gates, had made it impossible for snail darters to 
return through the sluices to their spawning grounds above the 
dam. (Meanwhile, in each of the last two years, TVA, in 
f_l I cooperation with the Department of the Interior, has moved 
~ snail darters from locations below the dam to locations above 
the dam.) The Secretary has recently denied TVA's petition. 
]Q.c...~ ,\q11. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I 
The Gourt of appeals erred in concluding that Sec-
tion 7 of the Endangered Species Act prohibits the 
completion of a project that was begun six years 
before the Act "was passed, that was more than 50 
percent complete "vhen the Act was passed, and that 
was approximately 75 percent complete when a species 
affected by the project was listed as endangered and 
its habitat listed as critical. Section 7, entLtled "Inter-
agency Oooperation," directs all federal agencies to 
consult with the Secretary of the Interior regarding 
actions affecting endangered species and to " utilize 
their authorities in flutherance of the purposes of 
this Act * * * by taking such action necessary to 
insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out 
by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of 
such endangered species ";:- * * or result in the destruc-
tion or modification of [a critical] habitat of such 
species * * * . " 
The court of appeals erroneously construed "ac-
tionsauthorized, funded, or carried out" to include 
any action an agency may take with respect to a 
public works project. This construction would pro-
hibit an agency from maintaining a long-completed 
facility that was found to threaten the habitat of a 
newly "discovered endangered species. It would pro-
hibit an agency from putting into use a fully com-
pleted project that was found to have such an effect, 
regardless of the amount of resources that had been 
expended on the project and that would consequently 
be wasted, and regardless of the importance of the 
22 
As a general principle, courts should not ordinarily 
infer from appropriations acts an int'ent by Congress 
to repeal or modify substantive law. But wh~r~ Con-
O'ress has clearly indicated such an intent, decIsIOns of 
;his Court and the courts of appeals establish that 
the courts must give effect to it. In the particular 
and unusual circumstances presented here, Congress 
has indicated such an intent with respect to the Tellico 
project. 
In this case the purpose ·of the subsequent ap-
propriations Acts is iTreconcilable with t~e En~al~­
gered Species Act as construed and apphed to vhlS 
project by the court of appeals. Of course, Congress 
1 
did not believe that its appropriations were in con-
flict with the Act; it believed- corTectly, we submit-
that the Act did not apply to projects such as this 
one. 
But accepting arguendo the interpretation 'of the 
Endangered Species Act that the resDondents urged 
and the court of appeals adopted- an interpretation 
of which Congress was well aware-there is a con-
flict between the Act and the subsequent appropria-
tions measures in their application to this project. 
Either Congress intended that the project be halted, 
or Congress intended that it go forward whether or 
not the Endangered Species Act would otherwise 
forbid it. That conflict distinguishes this case from 
the typical ones in which subsequent appropriations 
Acts can be reconciled with the substantive commands 
of prior law. It requires a thorough examination of 
the evidence of Congress's intent. 
23 
The specific evidence of Congress's intent with 
resped · to this particular project is reflected in the 
reports of Committees of both Houses on the enacted 
appropriations Acts in three successive years. More-
over, the appropriations Act adopted in 1977, after 
the decision of the court of appeals, contained aspe-
cial appropriation for the purpose, stated in the Act 
itself, of enabling TVA "to relocate endangered or 
threatened species to other suitable habitats as may be 
necessary to expedite project construction." This en-
actment was intended as a legislative resolution of the 
impasse created by the court of appeals' decision. The 
totality of the legislative record over the three-year 
period likewise shows that Congress intended that the 
Tellico project be completed notwithstanding ·the as-
serted prohibition of the Endangered Species Act. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
SECTION 7 OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES AQT DOES NOT 
PROHIBIT COMPLETION OF THE TELLICO PROJECT 
Construction of the Tellico project began in 1967. 
The project was more than 50 percent completed when 
the snail darter was discovered in August 1973 and 
when the Endangered Species Act was enacted in 
December 1973 (Pet. App. B, p. 33A). The project 
was approximately 75 percent completed when the 
snail darter was listed as an endangered species in 
November 1975 (Pet. App. B, p. 33A). In April 1976, 
when the Secretary listed the portion of the river to 
be impounded as the snail darter's "critical habitat" 
253-835--77----5 
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and when the trial was held, the project was about 
80 percent completed and about $80 Inillion had been 
invested in it (Pet. App. B, pp.33A-34, 36A)/& : 
, The district court ruled that Section 7 of the En-
dangered Species Act Was not intended to prohibit 
completion of a project in such circumstances. "At 
some point in time a federal project becomes so near 
completion and so incapable of modification that a 
court of equity should not apply a statute enacted 
long after inception of the project to produce an 
unreasonable result," the court said (Pet. App. B, 
pp. 36A-37 A). The court of appeals, hmvever, held that 
Section 7 does "include the terminal phases of on-
going projects among the' actions' of departments and 
agencies to be scrutinized for compliance" (Pet. App. 
A, p . llA). The court said it would "give the term 
'actions' its plain meaning" (iLl. at l1A), declaring 
that" [c]onscientious enforcement of the Act requires 
that it be taken to its logical extreme" (id. at 12A). 
We submit that Section 7 of the Act does not pro-
hibit completion of ' the Tellico project~ The language 
referring to "actions authorized, funded, or carried 
out" by federal agencies does not mean every action 
by such an agency, including the dedication of a proj-
ect long under construction or the maintenance of 
I 
a project already in operation. It means actions that 
present the agency 'with reasonable alternatives; it 
refers to a stage in the decision-making process where 
18 The district court found that of the $80 million, approxi-
mately $53 million would be nonrecoverable .if the project was 
not completed. (Pet. App. B, p. 35A) ; Since then, TVA estimates 
that an additional $27 million- has been invested in the project 
under the direction of Congtess, much of which 'would be non-
recoverab 1 c. 
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, " ' . . " ; 
the" - agency has not' substantiaJly completed ' all 
"acti?I~f'._but. is stil~ ~n a~reasonable ~Josit~on to avoi.q t 
authorIzmg It, fundmg It, or carrymg It out. Thu3V 
I . -' , • 
interpr~tation accords with the language of Section 7 
an~l IS supported by the structure and purpose of that 
section, by principles of statutory construction re-
flectedin relevant case law, by such indications as 
there ,. are in the legislative history, and by confirma-
tion in subsequent congressional enactments. 
A. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE DOES NOT CO~IPEL TIlE COURT OF 
APPEALS' CONSTRUCTION OF TIlE ACT 
Section 7 of the Act, in relevant part, directs all 
federal agencies to 
utilize their authorities in furtherance of the 
pllI'pOSeS of this Act * * * by taking such 
.' action necessary to insure that actions author-
ized, funded, or carried out by them do not 
jeopardize the continued existence of such en-
chtngered species * * * or result in the destruc-
tion or modification of [a critical] habitat of ~7 
such species * * * . 
While the court of ' appeals purported to "give the 
term "actions 'its plain meaning," it is well established 
that even the unambiguous meaning of statutory 
words does not control when such a reading would be 
unreasonable in view of the statute's purpose.19 Here, 
19 In Ohurch of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 
457, 4q9"the Court stated: 
It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the let-
, tel' ()f the statute and. yet not within the statute, be-
. caw~e not within it$ spirit, nor within the intention of 
its _makers. ':< * * T:p.is is not the .8l1bstitutionof the will of 
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the mell,ning of the term "actions" is not so "plain" in 
the first place. The word is part of the phra§e: "ac-
tions authorized, ftmded, or carried out." If the v~rb 
"carried out" is read in pari materiae with ,"auth()r-
ized" and "funded," as it should be,one sees that the 
"actions" referred to are not all the actions that an 
agency can ever take, but rather actions that the ' 
agency i~ deciding whether to authorize, to fund, or to 
carry out. That is, they are p1~ospective actions-
actions with respect to which the agency has reason-
able decision-making alternatives before it. 
The "actions" that an agency would be prohibited 
from "carrying out" under the statute do not include, 
for example, each day's maintenance of a compl~ted 
highway or military installation which is found to 
threaten the critical habitat of a newly discovered en-
dangered species. The agency would not be required, 
the judge for that of the legislator, for frequently words l of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad 
enough to include an act in question, and yet a consider-
ation of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances 
surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which 
follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, 
makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator in-
tended to include the particular act. 
See also United States v. Witkovich~ 353 U .S. 194, 199; Uniteij 
States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543; 
International T. & 1'. Oorp. v. Geneml T. & E. Oorp., 518 F. 2d 
913,917-918 (G.A. 9) ; Oity of L08 Angeles v. Adams, 556 F. 2d 40 
(C.A. D.C.). .' . 
One well-known line of cases in which this Court has refused 
to apply the literal words of a statute to produce an unreason- ./J 
able result involves tlle construction of the words "every per- j! 
son" in 42 , U .S.C. 1983. E.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 
367; Pierson v; Ray, 386 UB. 547'; Imblerv. Pacntman, 424 • 
U.S: 409; . -" . 
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in such a case, to iet the project revert to a wilderness 
condition. Nor would the prohibited "actions" include, 
as in the hypothetical example discussed by the COtuts 
below (Pet. App. B, p. SA; Pet. App. A, p. 12A; see 
hote - 15,s1,tpra), the impounding of water behind 
a fully completed dam where an endangered species of 
fish was discovered in the river (or an endangered 
species of plant on the land) the day before the im-
potmdment was scheduled to take place. To construe 
the statute as including such "actions" would be un-
reasonable and could not have been intended by the 
Congl'ess; nor is it required by any "plain meaning" of 
the words. 
A more reasonable construction, in keeping with 
Section 7 as a whole, with its purpose, its title ("Inter-
agency cooperation") ,20 and its prospective focus, 
would define "actions" to be "carried out" in terms of 
those points in the decision-making process where the \I 'NQ ~I( 
agency can still make choices, choices that are consist- It,:t:LI 
ent with cOlIDnitments it has already made and that do IY(' 
not require substantial waste of unrecoverable re- I~~;? 
20 As the title indicates, a central concern of Section 7 is cooper-
ation between the Secretary of the Interior and other agencies 
to promote the pm'l/o'ses of the Act. The court of appeals, in an 
apparent effort to soften its draconian interpretation of the Act, 
sta.ted that "the Secreta.ry of the Interior can properly ,exempt 
Tellico from compliance with the Act" (Pet. App. A, p. 20A). 
The Secretary, however, would appear to have no such authority 
with respect to Sedion 7 (compare his authority under Section 
10 to grant "exceptions" for violations of Section 9). He could 
"exempt Tellico" only by making a snpportable determination, 
on the record, that the snail darter was no longer an endangered 
species or that the stretch of river in question was no longer 
a "critical habitat" of the snail darter. 
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sources.21 At some point in the development of a public 
works project, further steps to complete it or to put it 
into operation ~re not new actions within the l~le~ning 
of the statute, but an illseparable part of actio~s aL-
ready taken. vVhere that point occurs will vary 
21 Proposed regulations under the Act prepared jointly by 
the Fish and 'Wildlife Service (FWS) of the Department of the 
Interior and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) of 
the Department of Commerce originally took just tllis positiOll, 
~tating in a preamble: . ; Neither FWS nor NMFS intends that section 7 bring 'I about the waste that can occur if an advanced project is 
'&' ~ halted. ,!, * * The affected agency must decide whether the 
t _ ~ ~ degree of completion and extent of public funding; of 
'-Y. .:\ particular projects justify an action that may be other-~ . A:7 . wise inconflistent with Section 7. [42 Fed. Reg. 4868, 
~.I 486~.] . . . .. 
However, III the recently promulgated final regulatIOns the IssUlng 
agencies have retracted this view, explaining: . 
This discussion in the preamble was based on an anal-
ysis of the case law on retroactivity under NEPA. It 
was originally believed that retroactive situations ullder 
NEP A and the Act were analogous enough to warrant 
the incorporation of the NEPA case law into the Section 
'7 regulations. . , 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the recent case 
of Hill v. TVA * * * considered this analogy and, rejected 
it. ~, * ,!, In light of the Sixth Circuit Court of Al)peals' 
analysis, therefore, the FWS and NMFS now reject the 
analysis of retroactivity in the proposed rule making's pre- . 
amble and adopt the rationale of the Sixth Circuit. [50 
C.F.R. 402.03,43 Fed. Reg. 870, 872, 875.J 
President Carter, howeverLin his Environmenal Message de-
livered to Congn~"s o n May 23, 1977, stated (13 'Weekly Compo 
Pres. Docs. 782 792 (1977)) : 
* * ~, [TJo hasten the protection of threatened and en-
dangered species, I am directing the Secretaries of Com-
merce and Interior to coordinate a government-wide effort, 
as reqllired by the Endangered Species Act of 1973, to 
identify all habitat under Federal jurisdiction or control 
29 ~~ 
witlCeach case, and requii'es consideration of the ob- 'J' u-~~ 
jectivesOf. Congress in authorizing the project, the al- "\ 
ternatives available to the agency, and the extent of ~ 
losses that would be occasioned by various 
alternatives. 
In short, the over-literal construction of the statute 
by the court of appeals was error. The district court 
properly construed it by a rule of reason, correctly de-
temining that it was not intended to prohibit the Gon-
cluding stages of actions that TVA had already "au-
thorized, funded, or carried ou~." 
B. PRlNCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, REFLECTED IN" RELEVANT 
CASE LA'V UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, ARE 
INCONSISTENT WITH APPLICATION OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
TO HALT A NEAP.LY FIN"ISHED PROJECT 
-----
The construction that we uTge is supported not only 
generally by a presumption against construing statutes 
to give them a retroactive effect, but specifically by 
decisions in analogous situations under the National 
Environmental Policy Act. As this Court stated in 
United States Fidelity cmd Guaranty 'Co. v. Struthers 
lVells 00., 209 U.S. 306, 314: 
The presumption is very strong that a statute f ~~ .. J;... 
was not meant to act retrospectively, and it -,.e; I 
ought never to receive such a construction if 
it is susceptible of any other. It ought not to 
that is critical to the survival and recovery of these 
species. The purpose of this program is to avoid the pos-
sibility that such habitats will be identified too late to 
affect federal project planning. Major projects now under-
... Yay that are found to pose a serious threat to . endangered 
species should be reassessed on a case-by-case basis. 
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receive such a construction unless the words 
used are so clear, strong and imperative that 
no other meaning can be annexed to them or 
unless the intention of the legislature cannot 
be otherwise satisfied. 
While this is the first case that squarely presents the 
issue under the Endangered Species Act/2 several 
courts have considered the analogous question under 
the National Environmental Policy Act. Applying the 
presumption against retroactivity, they have con-
cluded that that Act was not intended to apply 
to projects at an advanced stage of construction when . 
the Act was passed, even though the Act requires 
agencies to prepare an environmental impact state-
ment III connection with all "major Federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human en-
vironment * * *." 42 U.S.C. 4332(2) (C). As the court 
said in A1elington Coalition on Tran,sportation, v. 
22 Other decisions under the Act, although not squarely addres-
sing the issue, are consistent with our contention that the. Act is 
to be reasonably construed and not to be retroactively applied in 
circumstances such as those presented here. In National Wildlife 
Federation v. Coleman, 529 F. 2d 359 (C.A. 5), certiorari qenied 
sub nom. Boteler v. National WildZife Federation, 429 U.S. 979, 
the court considered the application of Section 7 to a portion of an 
interstate highway that would transect the critical habitat of the 
Mississippi sandhill crane but that was not yet under construction. 
In holding that Section 7 applied and required the Secretary of 
Transportation to consider modifications of the proposed route, 
the court stated that another portion of the highway, which also 
transected the critical habitat, "is substantially complete and is not 
involved in this controversy," noting that" [c ] onstruction of this 
portion of 1-10 was initiated in advance of the passage of the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973" (529 F. 2d at 363 and n~ 5). See 
also Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F. 2d 1289, 1304-1305 (C.A. 8). 
J 
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Volpe, 458 F. 2d 1323, 1331 (C.A.4), certiorari denied 
sub nom. Fugate v. Arlington CoalitM/, on Transpor-
tation, 409 U.S. 1000: 
Doubtless Congress did not intend that all 
projects ongoing at the effective date of the Act 
be subject to the requirements of Section 1.02. 
At some stage of progress, the costs of alter111g 
or abandoning the project could so definitely 
. outweigh Whatever benefits that might accrue 
therefrom that it might no longer be "possible" 
to change the project in accordance with Sec-
tion 102. At some stage, federal action may be 
so "complete" that applying the Act could .be 
considered a "retroactive" application not 111-
tended by the Congress. 
See also Raglancl v. M~wZler, 460 F. 2d 1196 (C.A. 5) ; 
Pizitz Inc. v. Volpe, 467 F. 2d 208 (C.A. 5); cf. 
, , 
G1'een,e County Plannil'l,g Board v. Federal Powe1· 
Omn1nission, 455 F. 2d 412, 424 (C.A. 2), certiorari 
denied, 409 U.S. 849.23 
23 Ordinarily the presumption against retroactivo applica-
tion requires that statutes not be applied to actions th~t h~ve 
taken place before the statute was enacted, and the mqmry 
would therefore focus on the degree of the project's comple-
t ion and the extent of unrecoverable commitments at the time 
of enactment. Even in terms of the degree of Tellico's comple-
tion (more than 50 percent) when the Endangered Spec~es 
Act was passed, the court of appeals' decision works a retroa?tlve 
application not intended by Congress. This is especially so Slllce, 
as the district court found (Pet. App. B, p. 31A), the only alterna-
tive to completincr the project is scrapping it. Applying the Act 
to scrap the proje~t would have the effect of nullifying Congress's 
purpose in appropriating funds for seven years before the Act was 
passed; . 
In addition, application of a statute to a proJect may b.e re~To­
active in another sense. "'\¥hen an agency implements a proJect III a 
, 
I' 
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Nothing in the langnage, design, 01' legislative, hIs-
tory " of the Endangered Species Act ' indicates' that 
Congress intended the Act to apply retroactively to 
projects substantially completed when the Act became 
applicable to them. 
C. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
DOES NOT INDICATE AN IXTEKT TO HALT T IlE COMPLETION OJ" 
PROJECTS IN THE CIRCUlVISTANCES OF THIS CASE 
N one of the committee reports or debates on the 
Endangered Species Act sheds clear light on the issues 
presented by this case.21 There were, however, two 
relevant discnssions. 
One 'of them discloses that Senator Tunney, the 
Senate sponsor of the bill, believed that Section 70f 
his bill, which was not materially different from Sec-
tion 7 of the Act/5 left to the responsible agency the 
good-faith and reasonable belief that its actions have 'complied 
with existing law, and shortly before completion of the project 
events occur that invoke the statute (here, the Secretary's listing 
the snail darter as an endangered species 'and theportio'n of the 
river as its critical habitat), application of the statute takes 
place, and has a retroactive effect, at that time. The consid-
erations underlying the general presumption against retroactive 
application also support the conclusion that the Endangered 
Species Act was not intended to halt projects when the threat to 
an endangered species comes to light in the final stages ·of the 
project's completion. 
24 See Report of the Senate Committee on Commerce, S. Rep. 
No. 93-307, 93cl Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) ; Report of the Hoi:i.se Com-
mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, I-LR. Rep. No. 93-412, 
93c1Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-740, 93cl 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); 119 Congo Rec. 25668-25700 (1973) ; 119 
Congo Rec. 30157-30175 (1973); 119 Congo Rec. 42528-<:1:2535 
(1973) ; 119 Congo Rec. 42910-42916 (1973). 
25 Coin pare Section 7 of S. 1983, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (set forth 
at 119 Congo Bee. 25664 (1973» with 16 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1536. 
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decision whether a particular project should be' COl1-
strr[cted.On the Senate floor, Senator Cook asked 
whether the bill would apply to a road that the Corps 
of Engineers planned to build in Kentucky throllgh a 
nesting area for wild turkeys. 119 Congo Rec. 25689 ~1.JW't'J 
(1973). Senator Tunney responded (119COllg. Rec. 
25689~25690 (1973)): 
* * * [AJs I understand it, after the consulta-
tion process .took place, the Bureau of Public 
Roads, or the Corps of Engineers, would not be 
prohibited fTombuilding such a road if they 
deemed it necessary to do so. 
** * [AJs I read the language, there has to 
be consultation. However, the Bureau of Pub-
lic Roads or any other agency would have the 
final decision as to whether such a road should 
be built. That is my interpretation of the leg-
islation at any rate. 
In ; other words, Senator Tunney appears to have 
understood his bill as requiring ggenci~ to consider 
the impact of their pl>ospective actions on endangered 
species, and as reg~'ing them to engage in the kind 
of 12alan~ng .J2.rocess mandated bY"the N ational- En-
vironmental Policy Act, but not as prohibiting them 
-------- - --"- ~- --- -
,from constructing a project if, after such balancing, 
they concluded that the public interest waTrantec1 it. 
Under this view, a fOTtioTi the Act would not auto-
matically require the halting of a project that was 
substantially completed when the Act became ap-
plicable to it. 
The other discussion indicates that Congressman 
DingelI, o11eof the supporters of the House bill, had 
{ 
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a somewhat different understanding of Section 7. In 
discussing a newspaper article concerning the effects 
on whooping cranes in Texas of Air Force bombing 
practices, Mr. Dingell stated: 
Under existing law, the Secretary of De-
fense has some discretion as to whether or not 
he will take the necessary action to see that 
this threat disappeal~s. * * * [O]nce the bill is 
enacted, he or any subsequent Secretary of 
Defense would be required to take the neces-
sary steps. [119 Congo Rec. 42913 (1973).] 
Mr. Dingell's remarks were addressed to circum-
stances where there would appear to be readily 
available alternatives to the action in question. That 
,. 
is not the situation here, where a project "vas sub-
. p 
stantially complete when the Act "vas in~}red and 
where, as the district court found, "there are no alter-
natives to impoundment of the reservoir, short of 
scrapping the entire project" (Pet. App. B, p. 31A). 
D. SUBSEQUENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION CONFIRJlfS TltAT TT:!E EX-
-DANGERED SPEcms ACT WAS NOT INTENDED TO HALT COMPLETION 
OF A PROJECT AS FAR ADVANCED AS TELLICO 
Congress in 1975, 1976, and 197'7, with full kno,vl-
edge about Tellico's effect on the snail darter and the 
alleged violation of the Endangered Species Act that 
would result from the project's completion, appro-
priated money for the completion of the project. In 
doing so, the Appropriations Committees expressly 
stated their view that the Act did not prohibit tho 
project's completion, a view that Congress presum-
ably accepted in passing the appropriations. These 
- I 
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apprQpriatiQns measures and their legislative hi~tory 
confirm our construction of the Act. 
In 1975, 1976, and 1977, as we noted at pages7- 18, 
supr(J,) TVA fully informed appropriations subcom-
mittees of both Houses about the snail darier, about 
claims that completion of the project would destroy 
its habitat in violation of the Endangered Species 
Act,and about TVA's view that while it was doing 
its b~st to preserve the fish, "the project should be 
completed in any event." 
Possessed of this information, the House Appro-
p:riations COl1lIItittee in 1975, and the Senate Appro-
priations Committee in 1976, directed in their reports 
that the project "be completed as promptly as pos-
sible * * * in the public interest." The 1976 report of 
the Senate Committee explicitly stated, moreover, that 
" [t ]he Committee does not view the Endangered 
Species Act as prohibiting the completion of the 
Tellico project at its advanced stage * * * " (see 
p. 10, supra). 
And in 1977, after being informed of the court of 
appeals' decision halting the project, both the House 
and Senate Committees declared it their view that the 
Act was not intended to halt projects such as Tellico 
and recommended further appropriations to complete 
the pr9ject.26 The House Report also recommended 
~6 The 1977 Report of the House Appropriations Committee 
stated (see p. 15, supra) : "It is the Committee's view that the 
Endangered Species Act was not intended to halt projects such 
as these in their advanced stage of compJetion* * *." 
The 1977 Report of the Senate Appropriations Committee 
stated (see p. 16, supra): "This Committee has not viewed 
the Endangered Species Act as preventing the completion and 
I 
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additional funds-which were appropriated-' ' for re-
location of !he snail dar~er "rather than delay or 
stoppage of projects." Moreover, the House flOOl~ 
manager of the appropriations bill pointed out during 
that chamber's consideration of the legislation that 
the snail darter was an "endangered species that now 
threaten [s] the completion of * * * the Tellico Dam" 
(supra, p. 17). 
In all three years, Congress follo,ved, the Commit-
tees' recommendations and appl~opriated the requested 
funds. 
""Vhile this Court has held that statements by indi-
vidual Congressmen concerning the meaning of · an 
earlier statute are not significant (see, e.g., Regional 
Rail Reorgctnization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132),. 
it has also held that " [ s] ubsequent legislation declar-
ing the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great 
weight in statutory construction" (Red Lion Broad-
casting' Co. v. Federal Commun,ications C01nmission 
" 395 U.S. 367, 380-381) .27 T..Q...he S]l;I!P~ here the intent 
was declared not by the sgl)segueI,!t..!eglslation itself 
(except for the 1977 appropriations Act) / 8 but by 
use of these projects which were well under way at the time 
the affected species were listed as endangered." The Commit-. 
tee added: "If the act has such an effect, which is contrary· 
~o the ~ommittee's understanding of the intent of Congre~~: 
III en~ctIllg the Endangered Species Act, funds should be ap-
propnatBd to allow these projects to be completed and their· 
benefits r~alized in the public interest, the Endangered Species: 
Act notwIthstanding" (ibid.). 
~7 See also AdolJ1w' Wrecking Co. v. United States, No. 7s..:-911 
decided January 10, 1978, slip op. 12-13. ". , 
28 Theapptopriations ·Act 'passed in 1977 (seepp. 17-18, supra}. 
stated that $2,000,000 was being appropriated "to ccarry out the-., 
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committee , ,reports recommending the legislation. In 
the circumstances, hO\~Tever, .the ell~ct1.Uent of the ap-
propriations would have been futile unless Congress 
as a whole agreed with the committees that comple-
tion 'of the Tellico proj ect was not barred by the 
earlier Act (or lUlless Congress intended to modify 
that Act if it did bar the project, an alternative dis-
cussed' in Part II, infra). . 
Moreover, in contexts comparable to those presented 
here, the Court has recognized that the subsequent 
appropriations Acts themselves are entitled tosig-
nificant weight in determining Congress's original 
intent. In Flem,ing v. J110hawk TVrecking &: .Lwn-
ber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 116, the Court upheld the 
statutory authority of the President to transfer the 
functions of the Office of Price Administration to 
another agency on the ground, among others, that 
"the appropriation by Congress of funds for the use 
of such agencies stands as confirmation and ratifica-
tion of the action of the Chief Executive." 
In Brooks v. DeWa1", 313 U.S. 354, the Court 
upheld the statutory authority of the Secretary of the 
Interior to grant temporary grazing licenses and col-
lect fees for them,on the ground that Congress, with 
knowledge of the Secretary's practice, had repeatecUy 
appropriated funds for the purposes of the statute 
from the revenues received from the fees. "The , re-
peated appropriations of the proceeds of the fees * * * 
purposes of the Endangered Speeie.c:; Act of 1973 * * * i~lcludjnO" 
. ' " , ' b 
cooperatIve efforts as contemplated by that Act t() reloeateepdall- , 
gered or .~hrea,te~ed ~pecies to ~ther suitable habitats as may be 
n~cess~ry' ,to expedite pr.oject. construction.?' (See p. J8~ ' 8upra.) 
I 
I 
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not only confirms the departmental construction of the 
statute but constitutes a ratification of the action of 
, . 
the Secretary as the agent of Congress in the admlll-
istration of the act" (313 U.S. at 361). 
Congress here, in repeatedly appropriating funds 
to complete the Tellico project, indicated by its Acts 
and expressly stated by its committee reports its 
aO'reement with TVA that the Endangered Species 
b • 
Act was not intended to halt Tellico or similar proJ-
ects. If that expression is not legally conclusive, it is 
at least entitled to considerable weight in construing 
the Act, and it confirms the construction on which 
we rely. 
II 
EVEN IF SECTION 7 OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
WERE 'OTHERWISE C'ONSTRUED AS PR'OHIBITING C'OM-
PLETION 'OF THE TELLIC'O PR'OJECT, CONGRESS, IN AP-
PR'OPRIATING FUNDS T'O C'OMPLETE THE PR'OJECT WITH 
FULL KN'OWLEDGE 'OF ITS ADVERSE EFFECT 'ON THE SNAIL 
DARTER AND ITS ASSERTED VIOLATION OF THE ACT, DI-
RECrrED THAT THE PROJECT BE COMPLETED NOTWITH-
STANDING THOSE CONSIDERATIONS 
We have argued in Part I that the Endangered 
Species Act, properly construed, does not prohibit 
completion of the Tellico project. If the Court agrees, 
it is unnecessary to reach any ,other issue in the case. 
But if the Court disagrees with our construction of 
the Act, there is an alternative basis for reversing 
the court of appeals' judgment: The sl1'bsequentap-
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propriations measures enacted by Congress con-
stituted, in the particular circumstances of this case, 
a legislative determination exempting this project 
from the effect of the Endangered Species Act. 
As a general principle, courts ordinarily should not 
infer from appropriations Acts an intent by Congress 
to repeal or modify substantive law. The doctrine dis-
favoring repeals by implication "applies with full 
vigor when * * * the subsequent legislation is an ap-
propriations measure * * *." COl1t1nittee for NucleClr 
Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F. 2d 783, 785 
(C.A. D.C.). With full respect for this principle, we 
submit that in the particular and unusual circum-
stances of this case, Congress, through its appropria-
tions Acts, made a legislative determination that this 
project should be completed whether or not the En-
dangered Species Act vvould otherwise prohibit its 
completion. 
The function of courts in construing legislation is 
to cany out the will of Congress as best it can be 
ascertained. That Congress's intent may not be readily 
apparent, or that the evidence bearing on it may be 
in conflict, does not remove the need to decide what 
the intent was. For this purpose courts may consider 
all available land relevant materials. The inquiry in 
each case requires consideration and weighing of the 
totality of the available evidence, with due regard to 
all the circumstances affecting its probative value. As 
Chief Justice Marshall said in United States v. 
Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386: 
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Where the mind labors to discover the design 
of the legislature, it seizes everything from 
whicl1 aid can be derived; * * *. 
See also Train v. Oolorado Public Interest Resea1"ch 
Groitp, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 10; United States v. A11ter-
iccm Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543- 544; 
Keifer &; Keifer v. ReconstnLction Finance Om"p., 
306 U.S. 381, 389. Materials derived from appropria-
tions legislation are among the evidence that may be 
considered. See United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 
554; Friends of the Earth v. Arm,strong, 485 F. 2d 1 
(C.A. 10) (en banc), certiorari denied, 414 U.S. 1171; 
Oity of Los Angeles v. Adams, 556 F. 2d 40 
(C.A. D.C.) 
Three principal considerations, which are distinc-
tive to this case, bear on the question of Congress's 
intent with respect to the Tellico project: first, the 
conflict between the effect of the Endangered Species 
Act, as construed by respondents and the court of ap-
peals,and the enactment and purpose of congressional 
appropriations made with knowledge of that asserted 
effect; second, the specific indications of Congress's 
intent contained in the legislative history of the appro-
priations Acts and in one case in the Act itself; and 
third, the use by Congress of appropriations legisla-
tion to manifest its intent. The totality of the evidence, 
, assessed in the light of these considerations, evinces a 
legislative determination that this particular project 
should be completed as quickly as possible whether or 
not its completion would otherwise contravene the 
Endangered Species Act. 
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A. THE APPLICATION TO THE TELLICO PROJECT OF THE ENDANGERED 
SPECIES ACT, AS CONSTRUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS,IS IN DIRECT 
CONFLICT WITH THE PURPOSE OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS 
FOR THE PROJECT SUBSEQUENT TO PASSAGE OF THE ACT 
Given the interpretation of the Endangered Species 
Act by the court of appeals, this case, in contrast to 
most others, presents an irreconcilable conflict between 
different congressional statutes as construed and 
applied to the facts presented. This circumstance fore-
closes the possibility of giving full effect to the con-
gressional purposes reflected in both statutes. It 
requires a choice to be made. 
Respondents have contended, and the court of ap-
peals agreed, that completion of the Tellico project 
by impoundment of the reservoir is implacably pro-
hibited by the Endangered Species Act. It will remain 
prohibited, under this interpretation of the Act, as 
long as the snail darter is listed as an endangered 
species and the portion of the river proposed to be 
impounded is listed as a critical habitat of the species. 
~ven a successful transplanting of the fish to another 
river would not lift the prohibition, if the original 
habitat continued to be a "critical habitat." 29 
29 The Act does not define "critical habitat," but regulations 
promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior define the term 
as (50 C.F.R. 402.02, 43 Fed. Reg. 874-875) : 
[AJ ~y * * * area * * * the loss of which would ap-
preCIably decrease the likelihood of the survival and 
recovery of a listed species or a distinct segment of its 
popl~lation. * * * Critical habitat may represent any 
portIOn of the present habitat of a listed species * * *. 
Thus, eyen if some snail darters were successfully transplanted 
to ~ll:other nve1', their ol'iginal habitat might not cease to be 
"cI'ltlcal," at least for "a distinct segment of [their] population," 
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'After enactment of the Endangered Species Act 
and after the listing of the snail darter . as an endan-
gered species, Congress, with knowledge of the Tellico 
project's effect on the snail darter, passed appropria-
tions Acts for the express purpose of completing the 
Tellico project. The manifest intent of these appropria-
tions was that the project be completed and utilized 
notwithstanding its effect on this fish. It is not 
reasonable to assume that Congress would appropriate 
money to finish a project that could never be used. 
Thus, with respect to this project, the p.!:l!pose of 
the appropriations legislation is in direct conflict with 
what the court of appeals believed to be the intent 
and effect of the Endangered Species Act. Whether 
or not the fact of appropriations, standing alone, 
would be dispositive of the question of intent, the court 
of appeals erred in disregarding the appropriations 
legislation altogether on the basis of the canon that 
repeals by implication are disfavored (Pet. App. A, 
p. 16A). 
Repeals by implication are indeed disfavored, and 
the only permissible justification for a repeal 
by implication is when the earlier and later 
statutes are irreconcilable. * * * 
* .* * [WJhen two statutes are capable of co-
existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a 
clearly expressed congressional intention to the 
contrary, to regard each as effective. * * * 
lrlorton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-551. "The 
principle carries special weight when we are urged to 
so long as the species remained sufficiently small in number to 
remain "endangered." 
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find that a specific statute has been repealed by a more 
general one." United States v. United Continental 
Tuna Corp.,425 U.S. 164, 169. 
But this case, given the ruling of the court of 
appeals, is precisely a case where "the earlier and 
later statutes are irreconcilable." Moreover, this is 
not a case where a general statute is claimed to work 
an implicit repeal of a more specific one, but a case 
where specific statutes implicitly exempt a particular 
project from the claimed operation of a priorgen-
eral statute. Thus, in Muniz v. Hoff11wn, 422 U.S. 454, 
458, the Court stated, "it is not unusual that excep-
tions to the applicability of a statute's otherwise all-
inclusive language are not contained in the enactment 
itself but are found in another statute dealing with 
particular situations to which the first statute might 
otherwise apply." 30 
The circumstances of this case are also substantially 
different from those presented where appropriations 
for projects are claimed to implicitly exempt those 
projects from general statutes- including most forms 
of environmental legislation-that impose require-
ments with respect to the manner in which a project 
is carried out but do not prohibit the project. 'The 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 
U.S.C. 4332, for example, requires agencies to con-
sider, and prepare a detailed statement on, the en-
30 In such circumstances, some of the usual considerations 
militating against repeal by implication are not present. See 
United States v. United Oontinental T1tna Oorp., supra, 425 
U.S. at 169. The very specificity of the subsequent statutes 
tends to show that Congress contemplated and intended their 
particular consequences. 
I 
I 
II 
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vironmental impact of proposed actions. But in con-
trast to the Endangered Species Act as construed by 
the court of appeals, NEP A leaves to the agency the 
fuial determination of whether the benefits of a proj-
ect justify its implementation despite adverse effects 
on the environment (see, e.g., Enviromnental Defense 
Furtd, Inc. v. Armst1'ong, 487 F. 2d 814 (C.A. 9), 
certiorari denied, 416 U.S. 974). 
Thus there is no conflict behveen continued appro-
priations for a project and the general requirement 
that the agency consider and prepare a statement 
detaillllg the environmental iml)acts; and there would 
ordinarily be no basis for concluding that appropria-
tions Acts were intended to exempt the project from 
the general commands of the prior law. See, e.g., 
Env'ironmerdal Defense Fund, Inc. v. F11oehlke, 473 
F. 2d 346, 455 (C.A. 8) ; Enviromnental Def67tse Fund 
v. Tennessee Valley Autho1'ity, 468 F. 2d 1164, 1182 
(C.A. 6) ; Committee for N~~clea,1' Responsibility, Inc. 
v. Seaborg, 463 F. 2d 783, 785 (C.A. D.C.). The same 
would be true of most statutes imposing general re-
quir~ments 'with respect to the manner in which agen-
cies implement their programs, such as r equirements 
concerning equal opportunity practices or procedural 
mechanisms. 
In this ~ase, however, if the Endangered Species 
Act has the intent and effect the court of appeals ac-
corded to it, the basic purpose of subsequent appro-
priations legislation will necessarily be frustrated: At 
the least this conflict warrants consideration of the , 
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subsequent legislation and examrnation of all the 
evidence bearing on Congress's intent. 
B. THE APPROPRIATIONS ACTS AND THEIR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY RE -
FLECT CONGRESS'S INTENT THAT THE TELLICO PROJECT BE C01\'I -
l'LETED AS QUICKLY AS l'OSSlBLE NOTWITHSTANDING TfUJ ENDAN-
GERED SP}: CIES ACT 
As we have noted (see pp. 7- 18, s~~p'J'Ct), appropri-
ations to complete the Tellico project were enacted 
for three successive years after the listing of ' the snail 
darter as an endangered species, and committee re-
ports for the last two years expressed the view that // 
the Endangered Sp~~~~~ .. ~et!~a~~:~ot }n~eil~~~-lo-l1aIr 
construc£loil-'o:fpl~oj ects such as this one. In addition, 
the 1977 Senate Report, issued after the court of ap-
peals decision, stated that "funds should be appro-
priated to allow these projects to be completed and 
their benefits realized in the public interest, the En-
dange'red Species Act notwithstanding" (emphasis 
supplied). 
While the court of appeals did not, of course, con-
sider the legislative history of the 1977 appropria-
tions Acts, it dismissed the legislative history of the 
1975 and 1976 Acts on the ground not only that repeals 
by implication are disfavored (see pp. 42-43, S~tpTa), 
but also that the statements in COlIDluttee reports 
were merely "advisory opinions" with respect to the 
meaning of the Endangered Species Act (Pet. App. 
A, p. 15A). But those stateinents were not expressions 
of personal opinion by individual legislators of the 
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kind that this Court has found lillpersuasive as evi-
dence of Congress's intent in passing a prior statute. 
See Regional Rail Reorgcmization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 
102, 132. They were statements in committee reports 
recorrnnending specific legislation for a specific pur-
pose, and Congress enacted that legislation. They 
therefore merit considerable weight as indications of 
the congressional intent embodied in the legislation. 
It is particularly significant, moreover, that the 
1977 House Committee Report recommended, and the 
1977 App1'opriations Act expressly provicled, a special 
appropriation 'of $2 million to TVA that was de-
signed, in the words of the Act, ",to carry out the pur-
poses of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 * * *, 
including cooperative efforts as contemplated by that 
Act to relocate endangered or threatened species to 
other suitable habitats as may be necessary to expedite 
project construction" (see pp. 15- 16, 18, supra) . If 
there could be any doubt, the House Committee Report 
and the statement on the floor by Congressman Bevill 
(see pp. 15-18, supra) make it clear that a major 
and specific purpose of this relocation program was 
to resolve the conflict between the Tellico project and 
the snail darter. The 1977 appropriations Act thus 
constitutes, as expressed in the language of the statute 
itself, an enactment designed to provide an alterna-
tive, legislative ,solution to the impasse created by the 
court of appeals' decision, la soluti'on based on relo-
cating the endangered species rather than scrapping 
the nearly completed project. 
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C. THE USE BY CONGRESS OF APPROPRIATIONS LEGISLATION TO ~[ANI­
FEST ITS INTENT WITH RESPECT TO TELLICO AND THE NEED FOR 
RECOURSE TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 'ro ESTABLISH THAT INTENT 
ARE CONSISTEN'.f WITH THE CONCLUSION THAT CONGRESS INTENDED 
'rELLICO TO BE COMPLETED AND UTILIZED NOll'WITHSTANDING TI-IE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
Congress acted in this case by appropriations legis-
lation, and it is not in the text of the statutes- with 
the significant exception of the 1977 appropriations 
Act- but rather in their legislative history that the 
intent with respect to Tellico is stated. The court 
below reasoned that "Congress must be free to aPljro-
priate funds for ' public works projects with the ex-
pectation that resulting executive action will pass 
judicial muster" (Pet. App. A, p. 16A), and pointed 
to "the danger of bypassing plenary [congressional] 
conside!ation of proposed modification to existing 
la.w~ bn dding amendments to appropriations bil~s" 
( tbtcZ. jifAs we have noted (p. 39, St~p1·a), a pproprla-
tions measures should not ordinarily be construed as 
repealin or modifying substantive law. 
~-Lhe considerations against inferring such an intent 
from appropriations measures are reflected in deci-
sions such as Environmental Defense Fund, Inc, v. 
FroehZke, st~pra, 473 F. 2d at 455; and C01nmittee for 
Nt~clear Responsibility v. Seaborg, supra, 463 F. 2d 
at 785. The argument is that i( ;'ppropriations legisla-
tion is taken as modifying substantive law, it "Yin be 
possible to amend or repeal substantive statutes in 
ways that do not truly reflect the intent of a majority 
I 
I 
, 
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of the Congress. This may be so, is argued either 
because the Congress as a vvhole does not devote as 
much attention to appropriations measures as to sub-
stantive legislation, or because the modifying or re-
pealing impact of appropriations measures often will 
be indicated only in the legislative history and there-
fore is less likely to be considered by all legislators. 
For reasons such as these, both Houses of Congress 
have adopted internal rules designed to assure their 
members that when they approve appropriations 
measures, they will not be nnknowingly changing 
existing law ((see note 34, infrCtV .3,1 Thus, the argument 
vvould conclude, appropriations measnres should not 
be considered to change existing lavv, or, at least, any 
such change must be expressed on the face of the ap-
propriations statute. 
But where, as here, the particular circumstances in-
dicate that COI!:~ss __ gi£l i~~d to change or override 
pre-existing-la w, the courts mUStg-Tve--e ffict to that 
intent. Decisions of this Court and other courts-estab-
lish that when appropriations measures and other 
statutes appear to have conflicting purposes, it is per-
missible and appropriate to go behind the face of the 
statutes to their legislative history, including the leg-
islative history of the appropriations measures, to 
discern the congressional will. 
The leading decision on the question is United 
States v. Dicke1"SOn, sttp1"a7 310 U.S. 554. A 1922 stat-
31 In addition, the President's veto power is arguably impaired 
by the difficulty of vetoing an entire appropriations Ad in order 
to reject a single appropriation that modifies substantive law. 
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ute authorized and directed the payment of bonuses to 
servicemen who reenlisted. In 1938 Congress passed a 
rider to the appropriations bill for the Rural Electri-
fica'tion Administration providing that "'no part of 
any appropriation contained in this or any other Act 
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1939, shall be avail-
able for the payment' of any enlistment allowance for 
ire-enlistments made during the fiscal year ending 
June 30, 1939, p otvvithstanding the applicable portions ;k 1te. a.;t 
of [the 1922 Act].' " 310 U.S. at 555. The 1938 appro~ 
priations measure did not expressly repeal the right to 
bonuses conferred by the 1922 statute for the 1939 fis-
cal year; the Court of Claims held, in fact, that it 
merely "restricted the funds available for payment of 
the allowance * * *" (310 U.S. at 555). 
But this Court reversed. The Court concluded on , 
the basis of the appropriations Act's legislative history, 
that it was intended to suspend the right to bonuses 
for that year. The Court brushed aside the claimant's 
contention that the words of the Act "are plain and 
unambiguous and that other aids to construction may 
not be utilized" (310 U.S. at 561), stating (id. at 562; 
footnote omitted): 
The very legislative materials which l'espond-
ent would exclude refute his assumption. It 
would be anomalous to close our minds to per-
suasive evidence of intention on the ground 
that reasonable men could not differ as to the 
meaning of the words. * * .X- The meanino' to be 
. ascribed to an Act of Congress can only b be de-
rived from a considered weighrng of every rele-
vant aid to construction. .. - - -
I 
I i 
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50 
Similarly, in United States v. Mitchell, 109 U.S. 
146, the Cour't concluded that appropriations statutes 
appropriating $300 per year for the salaries of certain 
employees evinced an intent to supersede a prior stat-
ute declaring and authorizing salaries of $500 and 
$400 per year for those employees. See also Dunwoody 
v. United States, 143 U.S. 578; C'ompare United States 
v. V ulte,233 U.S. 509; United States v. Langston, 118 
U.S. 389. 
Similar results have been reached in several court 
of appeals decisions involving appropriationslegisla-
tion. In Friends of the Ea1"th v . Armstrong, 485 F . 
21d 1 (O.A. 10), certiorari denied, 414 U.S. 1171, the 
C'ourt concluded that a 1962 appropriations Act pro-
viding that "no part of the funds herein appropriated 
shall be available for constTuction or operation of faci-
litiesto prevent waters of Lake Powell [a reservoir 
created by the Glen Canyon Dam] from entering any 
National Monument" repealed a 1956 statutory provi-
sion expressly prohibiting wateDs of the reservoir 
from entering any national park 'Or monument (485 
F. 2dat 7- 8). The appropriations statute did not ex-
pressly repeal the 1956 prohibition, or even refer to it, 
but the court concluded from its legislative. history 
that that was its intent and effect. 
A more recent ease; City of L08 Angeles v.~dams, 
556 F. 2d 40 (C.A. D.C.), involved a 1970 strutute that 
establishedan airport development program and au-
thori~ed anddireCied the Secretary of Transportation 
to make grants in each the next five years of "not 
less than" specified amounts for each year. Appropria-
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tionsActs in the following years, however, imposed 
limitations on the amount of appropriated funds that 
could, be made available for airport devel(}pment, lim-
itations that in several years were lower than the 
minimum ainount specified in the 1970 statute. The 
court, refeulng to the legislative history, concluded 
that the intent of the appropriations measures was 
to modify the amolmts that the authorizing statute 
authorized and directed to be spent, stating (556 F. 
2d. at 48--49 ; footnotes omitted): 
According to its own rules, Congress is not 
supposed to use appropriations measures as ve-
hicles for the amendment of general laws, 
including revision of expenditure authorization. 
In general, the doctrine disfavoring repeals by 
implication is said to apply "with full vigor" 
when the subsequent law is an appropriations 
measure, Where Congress chooses to do so, 
however, we are bound to follow Congress's 
last word on the matter even in anappropria-
tions law. 
See also Eisenb~rg v. Corning, 179 F. 2d 275 
(C.A. D.C.); Tayloe v. Kjaer, 171 F. 2d 343 
(C.A. D.C); compare New York Airways, Inc v. 
United States, 369 F. 2d 743 (Ct. C1.). 
Dickerson and the other cases cannot he distin-
guished from this case on the ground that TVA's ap-
propriations Acts do not on their face state an in-
tent to modify existing law, that intent being ex-
pressed only in the legislative history. Nothing on 
the face of the statutes considered in Dickerson or 
the other cases stated an intent to modify existing 
..---
52 
law; 32 the courts in each case were required to dis-
cern that intent from the legislative history. 
In Dickerson, Annst1'ong, ahd City of Los Angeles, 
the appropriations Acts did contain language relevant 
to the -conflict with- the prior statute. But in affirma-
\ tively appropriating money for completion of the Tel-
lico project, TVA's appropriations Acts seem more 
squ.arely in conflict with the Endangered Species Act, 
as interpreted to prohibit completion of that project, 
than wei'e the appropriations measures in Dickenon, 
A1nstrong, and City of Los AJ'/'geles that on their face 
only denied or limited appropriations. z3 In any event, 
consideration of legislative history to determine Con-
gress's intent in passing a statute is appropriate 
"however clear the words [of the statute] may appear 
on 'superficial examination'." United States v. AmM'i-
32 In Dickerson the language of the appropriations Act made 
no such statement, even though it did refer to the earlier statute 
-because it is well established that when a statute creates a vested 
right to money, that right is enforceable regardless of Congress's 
sub~equent failure to appropriate funds for the purpose. See, e.g., 
Unzted State8 v. Vulte, supra, 233 U.S, 509 ; New York Air1.oays 
Inc. v. United States, supra, 369 F. 2d at 748; d. Glidden 00. v: 
Zd{J;1wk , 370 U.S. 530, 570-571. Appropriations statutes that limit 
or pro~bit the expenditure of funds for a purpose previously 
a.uthol'lz~d therefore do not necessarily evince a purpose incon-
SIstent WIth the prior substantive directive. This was the basis of 
the. ruling for the Dickerson claimant by the Court of Claims, 
whI~h held that the appropriations Act only restricted the funds 
~LVallable for payment of the allowance (see 310 U.S. at 555; 89 
Ct. C1. 520). It was only by extensive resort to the leO'islative ~istory that this Court detennined in Dicker80n that Congress 
mtended by the appropriations Act to suspend the basic right to 
the payments (see 310 U.S. at 556-562). - -
33 See note 32, supra. - -- -- -
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can T'fttcking Assns., Trie., SUp1"a, 310 U.S, at 544; see 
also '1'rain v. Colorado Pub~ic Interest Resea1'ch 
GrOttp, Inc., sup1'a, 426 U.S. at 10; Cass v. Unitecl 
States, 417 U.S. 72, 77-79. 
In this case, Congress's intent with respect to 
Tellico is set forth in committee reports of both 
Houses for three successive years. This Court has rec-
ognized that statements in conm1ittee reports on 
enacted legislation are entitled to considerable weight 
in discerning the congressional will embodied in that 
legislation. E.g., United States v. International Union 
Ul1,ited Automobile, AircTaft and Agricultural I1npZe-
ment lVOl'kers of Al1terica, 352 U.S. 567, 585.34 The 
rationale of this view is that these are the documents 
that most members of Congress are likely to consider 
in voting on the legislation. The appropriations com-
mittee reports involved in this case are significant for 
3-1 There is no basis for supposing tha.t appropriations commit-
tee reports reflect the will of Congress any less than reports of 
other committees. 
The existence in both Houses of Congress of rules concern-
ing amendments to existing law through appropriations measures 
(see p. 48, s~tpra) does not affect the result here. Rules of the 
House of Representatives, Rule XXI, ~ 2, 94th Congo (1975), 
which prm;ides that no appropriations bill "changing existing law 
[shall] be in order," permits a point of order to be ra.ised and 
sustained with respect to appropriations legislation that chanO'es 
.. b 
eXIstmg law. It ..does not mean that appropriations legislat.ion 
changing existing law is not effective when, as in this case and in 
Dickenon, supra, 310 U.S. at 558, n. 2, no point of ord~r was 
raised. Senate Manual, Standing Rule XVI, ~ 4, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1975), prohibits amendments "propos[ing] generallegisla-
tion" to "be received to any general appropl'iation[s] bill." No 
such amendment is involved in this case, which concerns the intent 
of the appropriations legislation itself. 
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the saine reason. · The committee reports on legislation 
appropriatmg fUnds · for completion of the : Tellico 
project state an intent that the proj€ct be completed 
and utilized, its effect on the smlil <:tarter 'and · its 
~ileO'ed violation of the Endangered Species Act not-
. . b . 
withstanding. The clear weight of the legislative evi-
dmice; after considering all the factors bearing on its 
probative value, is that this was the will of Congress. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the court of appeals should . be 
reversed.35 
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35 The Secretary of the Interior has differing views on this case 
and presents them in the Appendix that follows. 
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APPENDIX 
VIEWS OF THE SECRETARY OF tt'HE INTERIOR 
The Secretary of the Interior disagrees with peti-
tioner's legal conclusion in this brief and has been 
authorized to present his views in this Appendix. 
The Secretary of the Interior has the responsibility 
for implementing the Endangered Species Act and has 
promulgated final regulations thereunder. 50 'C.F.R. 
section 402 (43 Fed. Reg. 870 (January 4, 1978) ). The 
Department of the Interior's (and the National l\1a-
rine Fisheries Service's) recent regulations, in section 
402.03, expressly apply to previously initiated projects 
where Federal involvement or control remains. Peti-
tioner's arguments on implied exemption and retroac-
tive application of the Act, if adopted, would substan-
tially undermine these regulations. 
This case presents policy issues far broader and more 
significant than whether a 3-inch endangered fish 
should prevail over a 70-foot dam. Beyond taking a 
position that would result in the extirpation of an en-
dangered species, petitioner would have this court dis-
regard (1) the plain terms of the Endangered Species 
Act of 1973, (2) the policy behind House Rule XXI, 
(3) the common law rule against repeals by implica-
tion, and (4) the hostility of the Courts to the doctrine 
of legislation by appropriation. 
For the reasons that follow, the Secretary of the In-
I terior believes that the court of :appeals decided this 
. case correctly. 
(la) 
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I 
PETITIONER HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH SECTION 7 
OF 'l.'HE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 
Petitioner argues that Section '7 of the Act does not 
prohibit completion of projects like Tellico that were 
50-75 percent completed when the Endangered Species 
Act was enacted and an endangered species was dis-
covered and listed by the Secretary of the Interior. 
This argument is contrary to congressional intent in 
enacting the Endangered Species Act and is not sup-
ported by applicable court decisions: If adopted,peti-
tioner's argument would have serious policy implica-
tions. 
The court below correctly interpreted congressional 
. intent in the application of Section 7 to on-going proj-
ects; quoting from Envi1'Omnental Defense Fund v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority, 468 F.2d 1164, 1176 
(C.A. 6): 
. Congress envisaged ongoing agency at-
tempts to minimize environmental harm caused 
by the implementation of agency programs. 
This could encompass not only constant re-
evaZ~tations of projects already begun to deter-
mine whether alterations can be made in exist-
ing features or whether there are alternatives 
to proceeding with the projects as initially 
planned, but also the consideration of the en-
vironmental impact of all proposed agency ac-
tion. Hill v. Tennessee Valley A~dh01'ity, 549 
F.2d 1064, 1072 (C.A. 6). [Emphasis in the 
, original1 ' - ' 
The NEPA eases cit~d by petitioner to SUPP9rt, 
by analogy,an exemption for Tellico Dam based on 
its degree of completion are simply not on point. In 
those cases, unlike this case, no viable alternatives 
-
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existed enabling meaningful application of the N a-
, tional Environmental Policy Act's environmental im-
pact statement requirement. 
Petitioner now refuses to look into a reasonable 
alternative that would both promote the economic and 
regional development objectives originally 'author-
ized by Congress and enable compliance with the En-
dangered Species Act. In his recent report to Con-
gress, the Comptroller General studied the Tellico 
Project, its costs, alternatives and benefits. The 
Comptroller General concluded that a comprehensive 
river-based regional development project, which pro-
motes intensive use of some 16,500 acres of valuable 
agricultural land, provides recreational benefits, of-
. fers industrial development potential, and , preserves 
historical, cultural and wildlife resources (including 
the endangered snail darter) may be a viable alterna-
tive to closure of Tellico Dam, but that TVA now re- I 
fuses to explore. it. «Report To The Congress- The 
Tennessee Valley Authority's Tellico Dant Project: 
Costs, AZte1'natives and Benefits", Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States, EMO-77-58 (October 14, 
1977) pp. 37...,.40 (hereafter cited as GAO Report).l 
GAO concluded that TVA might both satisfy the 
project's development objectives and comply with the 
Endangered Species Act: 
We recommend that . . . TVA · gather and 
provide to Cong'ress . . . detailed remaining 
cost and remaining benefit information on the 
Tellico-Project and . its alternatives .. . [IJni-
. . . lIt . would be wrong to conclude that abandonment of the 
Tellico Project would entail a total loss of project values. The 
GAO report on this project indicates that, depellding on land-
use ehoices, about $56.3 million of project costs could provide 
benefits for alternative uses. GAO Report, supm, page 5. 
J 
tial suggestions on developing alternatives, and 
subsequent comments on the methodologies, 
data bases, and resulting analyses should be 
obtained from the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, the Chairman of the 
Council on Environmental Quality, and the 
Secretary of the Interior ... 
Congress would have before it, for the first 
time a current detailed projection ... for ... 
the proposed reservoir proj ect and a compr~­
hensive river-based regional develop?nent P'fOJ-
eel offering such opportunities as recr~ation, 
agriculture and historical, cultural, and md~~..; 
trial development. [GAO Report, sup1'a, lat Ill, 
38, 40-41. (Emphasis added).] 
The fact that a viable alternative to the Tellico Dam 
reservoir project is 'also an alternative for preserva-
tion of the snail darter, suggests a basis for resolving 
this controversy administratively by remanding this 
case to the trial court to require petitioner to comply 
fully with the "consultati~" ~quirements of 
7 of the Endangered SpeCIes Act. 
Section 7 of the Endangered Species. Act, as applied 
to on-going projects, was intended to insure a rigorous 
examination of alternatives in the event completion of 
a project would extirpate 'a listed endangered species. 
TVA's exemption under the facts of this case would, if 
adopted, encourage and allow agencies to resist com-
pliance with Section , 7 's "consultation" requirement, 
, avoid careful examination of 'alternatives, and spend 
additional funds towards completion until the agency 
could argue that it is economically unreasonable to halt 
, the project. Petitioner's exemption arguments, if 
adopted, would preclude the successful effort to resolve 
conflicts between construction projects and the Endan-
gered Species Act by administrative ' rather than ,ju-
dicial, means. 
J 
1 .-' 
The Department of the Interior and the Council on 
Environmental Quality testified at oversight hearings 
on the Endangered Species Act before the Subcommit-
tee on Resource Protection of the Senate Conunittee 
on Environment 'and Public Works on J" uly 20, 1977. 
(Preprint pp. 95- 112, Serial 95-H33 (January 1978)). 
The Administration's position was that the Endan-
gered Species Act was , vwrking successfully and di9. 
not require amendments. Over 4500 successful "con-
sultations" pursuant to Section 7 of the Endangered 
Species Act have occurred. Although three cases have 
resulted in litigation, in only one instance-this case-
has the Section 7 "consultation" arrived at an impasse. 
As was related to Congress, it is the Administration's 
position that Section 7 "consultation" can successfully 
resolverconflicts if pursued as contemplated by the 
Act. The Secretary of the Interior submits that the 
Endangered Species Act is not unworkable or in-
flexible in the circumstances presented in this case. 
Petitioner's argunients for exempting on-going proj-
ects from Section 7 based on the facts in this case 
would, if adopted, set a dangerous precedent for agen-
Cies to exempt their on-going projects from compliance 
with other "consultation" laws such as the Historic 
Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. Section '470 
(1970). That Act requires agencies to consult wit.!l 
the Advisory Council on Historic Pl'eservation in 
cases where a pro]:>ose<:;l project may_ cause, adverse 
effects on . historical, cultural and archaeological re-
sources that are in the NatiQnalRegister or are 
eligible for th~ National Reg~ster: . ',' .,',',' ,", 
,-In ' short, petitio~er's ,exemption arguillent~ would, 
if, ,adopted, undermiliethe~ffective imple;rnentation of 
Sectio;n 7, of the End~ngered Species Act and relat~d 
legislative Tequlrell1ents. ",, ' ", , ' 
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THE CONGRESS DID NOT LEGISLATE BY APPROPRIATION AN 
EXEMPTION OF THE TELLICO DAM PROJECT FROM THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 
Petitioner argues that Congress, in appropriating 
funds to complete the Tellico project, intended to 
exempt that project from the effect of the Endan-
gered 'Species Act. In reaching this position, peti-
tioner is forced to rely on a theory of "exemption by 
the appropriations committee", since the appropria-
tions acts did not create the exemption contended for. 
The principal cases relied upon by petitioner in 
support of its legislation by appropriation argument 
do not hold that an exemption may be claimed to flow 
from an appropriation statute which is enti1'ely silent 
on the subject matter 'of the exemption. United States 
v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, involved ' a 1922 statute 
authorizing and directing the payment of bonuses to 
servicemen who re-enlisted. In 1938, Congress passed 
a rider to the appropriations bill for the Rural Elec-
trification Administration providing that "no part of 
any appropriation contained in this or any other 
Act for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1939 shall be 
available for the payment [of re-enlistment bonuses] 
for re-enlistments made during the fiscal year ending 
June 30, 1939, notwithstanding the applicable P01'-
tions of [the 1922 Act]" (emphasis added). The Court 
correctly concluded that the language in the appro-
priations statMte (aided by the legislative history) 
was intended to suspend the application of the 1922 
re-enlistment bonus provisions for that year. Unlike 
U.S.v. Dickerson, in this case the appropriations. 
bills contain no specific language indicating a com-
parable Congressional intent to suspend application 
of the Endangered Species Act to the Tellico Project. 
.. 
. 
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Friends of the Ea'rth v. Armstrong, 485 F.2d 1 
(C.A. 10) involved several statutes authorizing con-
struction of the Colorado River Basin Project, in-
eluding Glen Canyon Dam~ The first statute enacted 
. , 
111 1956, contemplated that waters from the resultina 
b 
Lake Powell had the physical potential of penetrating' 
into Rainbow Bridge National Monument and specified 
in Section 1 that " ... the Secretary of the Interior 
~hall . take adequate protective measures to preclude 
ImpaIrment of the Rainbow Bridge National Monu-
ment." The same statute also provided in Section 3 
however, that Congress did not intend any dam 01: 
reservoir project to 'be "within" any national park or 
monument. A later statute enacted in 1962 provided 
that Lake Powell be operated at maximum capacity, 
which meant that its waters would in fact penetrate 
Rainbow Bridge National Monument. In analyzing 
whether this statutory scheme was intended to pre-
ven~ any waters from entering into Hainbow Bridge 
NatIonal Monument, the Court construed the lan-
guage in the 1956 and ' 1962 statutes, together with 
express refusals and prohibitions by Congress to fund 
protective works for that Monument, as a. repeal of 
Sections 1 and 3 of the 1956 statutes. The court said 
" ... [I]n the case before us, the ... explanations 
in the cOlmnittee reports and in the legislation itself 
compel us to say that the provisions (Sections 1 and 
3) in the Storage Act were repealed", and" [t]his is 
thus not really a situation of repeal by implication.'" 
Friends of the Earth v. Ar1nstrong, 485 F.2d 1, 9 
(C.A.10) (emphasis added). 
Petitioner's reliance upon City of Los Angeles v. 
Adams, 556 F.2d 40 (C.A.D.C.), is similarly mis-
placed. There, language in appropriations statutes 
restricting the use of funds authorized by previous 
law was held controlling. Thus, in U.S. v. Dickerson;-
I 
I 
Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong and City of Los 
Angeles v. Adams, the repeal or amendment of the 
statutory requirements . was found in the language of 
the statutes themselves together with Congressional 
expressions in committee reports. The repeals and 
,amendments were not found solely in the fact that 
Congress appropriated funds for continued con-
struction of the proj ect or solely in expressions of 
Congressional intent found in the appropriations 
committee repoI·ts. 
This point was recently made by the Court in Sierra 
Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 638 at n. 42 (N.D. 
,Cal.) : 
[DJefendants' reliance upon Friends of the 
Earth v. A.r?nstrong, 485 F.2d 1 (10th Cit. 1973) 
(en banc) , cert. denied 414 U.S. 1171 (1974) is 
misplaced. There, congressional intent was quite 
explicit both on the face of the acts in question 
and in the accompanying legislative history. 
Similarly, in United States v. Dickerson, 310 
U.S. 554, 555 (1940), the 'Court held that Con-
gress could suspend certain provisions of a 
prior act (military re-enlistment allowances) 
t1lrough an amendment to an appropriation bill. 
However, in that case congressional intentw.as 
manifestly clear from both the language of the 
Act and the legislative history. 
We do not contend, nor do we understand the court 
'of appeals to hold, that express words of exemption 
must APpear on the face of the appropriations, statute. 
Nor 9-0 we unq.erstand the court of appeals :to hold 
that repeals must be enacted by specific reference to 
the statute from '.which exemption is sought. However 
) ) 
we have found no Case in which a repeal or exemption 
washeldtoflowfrQm a statute which is silent on the 
subject matter. To the extent that any general rule c~~ 
pedel'ived from ' cases involving argued. exemption~ 
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~ro~ substantiv~ requirements of other' law, it is that 
ImplIed exem~tlOn by appropriation is strongly dis...; 
~avored and WIll only be held to occur when the statute 
Itself,. together with its legislative history, manifests a 
~OnSCI?USneSs of the requested exemption 'and a clear 
rntentIon to g~ant i.t.2 C.ourts have traditionally been 
less sympathetIC to ImplIed exemptions in cases where 
the questioned administrative actions . are prohibited, 
by other law.3 . 
If appropriations committee reports could cre'ate 
statutory exemptions to the Endangered Species Act 
the reports in this case do not contain clear evidenc~ 
of such. committee intent. Rather, the reports are re-
plete WIth statements by TVA and the committees ex-
pressing the desire that the transplantinO' efforts be s~ccessful in order that the end'angered fi:h will sur-
VIve. 
~ Frtends of the Ea1'th v. A1'm8t1'ong, supm.j United States v. 
Dwkerson, supra.j Oom;mittee For Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. 
v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 785 (C.A.D.C.); Environmental De-
fer:se Fun~ ;. Froeh.lk~, 473 F. 2d 346, 354 (C.A. 8); D.O. Fedel"~ 
at~~n of Ozvw Assoc~twrqInc v. Airis, 391 F.2d 478 (O.A.D.C.); A~zonaPow~1' Poohng Ass~&tion v. Morton, 527 F.2d 721 (O.A. 
9), cert. denwd, 425 U.S. 911 (1976); City of Santa Olamv. 
/{lepp~, 418 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Oal.) ; A s80ciated Electrical 00-
operatzve, Inc. v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1167 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied .• 
4~3 U.S. 830; Em parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); NationallVild? 
life Federation v. Andrus, 10 E.R.C. 1353 1360 (D DO) 
3 Atchison, Topeka &: Santa Fe Rwy. '00. v. S~riwld, 229 
F.2d 782 (O.A.D.O.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Isomnt-
son-Moller 00. v. United States, 300 U.S. 139,146-147; Ivanhoe 
v. M(JO~acken, 357 U.S. 275, 293- 94; Environnwntal Defense 
Fwnj v. :Oorps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1140- 1141 (C.A. 5) ; 
Unzted Stat~s v. /{ennedy, 278 F.2d 1121 (O.A. 9); Oompare: 
A(a,un v. Un~ted States, 347 F.2d 970,978 (C.A.9) . Thompson y 
/ lifford,408 F.2d 154,166 (C.A.D.C,). · . , . • 
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The 1977 appropriations act , best exemplifies this 
uncertainty. While the reports indicate an intent that 
the Endangered Species Act should not prevent the 
completion and utilization of the project, t~e. appro-
priations act contains specific language requumg t~at 
-the purposes of the Endangered Species Act be carrIed 
out. (S. Rep. No. 95-301, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 98 
(1977); H.R. Rep. No. 95-379,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
103 (1977); Pub. L. No. 95-96, 91 Stat. 797 ,(1977)). 
Since closing the dam and filling the reser:ou w?uld 
immediately make transplantation efforts lillpossIb~e, 
it follows that Congress specifically contemplated m 
the appropriations act itself that dam closure must 
await evidence of a successful transplant. 
.. The June 20 1975 House Approprrations Committee; 
Report first ;elied upon by petitioner says nothing " 
about the Endangered Species Act.4 The snail darter 
had not even been listed as an endangered species at 
tlmt point, so the Act did not then apply and it would-
be a tenuous process of implication to suggest that the 
Committee intended to exempt the Tellico Project 
from an Act which did not even apply at the time. No 
greate'r implied intent c6uld be attributed to the Con.;. 
gress as a whole from sllc1;levidence. , ' 
" The June 17, 1976, Senate Report next relied upon 
by petitioner is cited for the proposition that the , 
Congress wished to complete the project not with-
standing the Endangered Species Act.- Petitioner 
turns ,the appropriations " committee '8 view that the , 
:Endangered Species Act did not then prohibit com-
pletion of the Tellico Pr()ject into an expression of ' 
---,...;-...,...,...~' " ," .... .. ~' :. A: .. committee report statement that ~he project "should be 
completed" does , pot compel the conclu .. slOn that money so ap- , 
:prop!¥th~d was intended "to ,be used in a way that would result III 
the ei~tion of the snail darter. That money was to complete 
acquisition and construction (and was in fact so spent), not to 
·close the Dam. 
;1 
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putative Congressional intent that the Act should 
not prevent the completion of the Project. 
But this language of the Report simply says noth-
ing about exempting Tellico from the Endangered 
Species Act; at best, it assumed (erroneously) that the 
Act was simply not an inhibiting factor. Petitioner's 
conclusion simply does not logically flow from state:.. 
ments in the committee report. We know nothing of 
what the Committee actually would have done if it had 
concluded that the Endangered Species Act did pro-
hibit Tellico completion, but we are constrained by. 
well-settled canons of construction to conclude that 
Congress is presumed to appropriate on the assump-
tion that theJ&"w will be complied with. Ex paTte \ 
lllndo, 3~lJ. S. ~83, 303. n. 24; G:T~en v. M.cE,lroy, 360 ) 
1).&---504; D.C. Federatwn of Cww Assocwtwns, Inc. 
v.. Airis, 391 F. 2d 478 (C.A.D.C.). 
The policy implications ·of petitioner's arguments . 
go far ," beyond that agency's immediate interest in 
vindicating its Tellico Dam Project. Petitioner's , nr:-
guments, if adopted, 'would enable an agency to avoid 
compliance with applicable law based on self-serving " 
testimony before an appropriations committee which 
has been inserted in an appropriationscommitte(3 " 
report. If an appropriations committee report alone 
is sufficient to indicate a Congressional intent to ex-
empt an agency from - applicable law, the orderly . 
process of amending statutes by the substantive com-
mittees in Congress is undermined;5 
' .5 In this case, the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries 
Committee, which has substantive responsibility for Endan-
gered Species Act amendments, did not heal' debate" on TV A's 
daimedexemption from that. Act. On the other hand, several 
bills which would exempt the Tellico Project from the Act' are ' 
clu;rentlypending in Congress; .. ' H.R. 4i67, H .R. 4557; H.R. 
5079, 95th Congress, 1st Session (1977) . . ' ! 
The potential for this to occur is particularly pro-
nounced in the case of TVA where specific author--
izing statutes are not required for each project and 
the appropriations process is the primary vehicle for 
review. 
Petitioner's theory of implied exemption will be' 
equally disruptive of the appropriatlons process in 
\ 
Congress. The ' appropriations acts relied upon by pe-
titioner would not have been subject to a member's 
point of order; under the HOuse Rules since the bills 
themselves contained no objectionable language. Thus,. 
adoption of petitioner's view of the effect of commit-
te :reports would ' require members of Congress to· 
either amend, or vote against, appropriations acts in 
order to excise unwanted effects intended by the ap-
propriations committee. We do not believe that the, 
law requires the establishment of this novel and lID-
settling view. - _ 
- The cases and policy views which have been dis-
cussed disclose the imporlance of the doctrine of leg-
islation by appropriation to _ executive agencies ancI 
how pervasively it is asserted as a basis for modify'": 
ing or repealing existing authority. The hostility of 
the courts to the doctrine in the better-reasoned, mod-
ern cases suggests a recognition of these disruptive 
influences,s This case, if decided in favor of petition-
er's position on exemption by appropriation, simply 
6 The facts of this case are similar to those in Atchison, To-
peka and Santa Fe Rwy. 00. v. Oallaway, 382 F. Supp. 610, 
620 (D.D.C.), vacated on other grounds, 431 F. Supp: ~22' 
(D.D.C.) . The Corps of Engineers sought an apprOprIatIOn 
to undertake project works which it then represented to the' 
appropriations Committee ~o be authorized by othe~ law, then 
claimed that very appropriations measure as authorIty for the -
action in question when the original authority was found lack- . 
ing by a court. 
.. ' 
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·could not be seen as having limited application. In 
point of fact, we are presented here with a funda-
mental question of separation of powers and of the 
integrity of the process by which budgets are set, 
projects are justified, and limitations on agency con-
duct are enacted and enforced. 
For example, the Department of the Interior has 
recently completed a Congressionally-mandated review 
of, among other things, the use of the doctrine of legis-
lation by appropriation to expand the scope of the San 
Luis Unit of the Bureau of Reclamation's Central Val-
ley Project (California) beyond its stated authoriza-
tion. The Report 7 concluded that the use of this doc-
trine to expand and alter previously stated statutory 
limitations has very serious implications for the bud-
get and for the integrity of the economic analysis upon 
which projects are largely justified. 
CONCLUSION 
The Secretary of the Interior believes that, prop-
erly viewed, the appropriations acts in question should 
have no particular impact on this litigation; that the 
only issue needful of resolution is whether the En-
dangered Species Act applies to the Tellico Project 
at aU; and that it does, as the court of appeals conectly 
concluded. 
Respectfully submitted. 
LEO M. KRULITZ, 
Solicitor, 
Department of the Interior. 
. , 7 "Special Task Force Report on San Luis Unit, Central Val-
ley Project, California (Public Law 95-46)" ( January 1, 1978) . 
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